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We present a socio-legal case study of the recent equal pay litigation wave in Britain, 
which saw an unprecedented increase in the number of claims, triggered in part by the 
entry of no-win, no-fee law firms into this part of the legal services market. Although the 
rise in litigation led to greater adversarialism in pay bargaining, litigation and collective 
bargaining mostly operated as complementary mechanisms in advancing an equality 
agenda. Although there are limits to the effectiveness of law-driven strategies in the face 
of organisational pressures to canalise and diffuse human rights, litigation may be a 
more potent force for social change than some recent accounts have suggested.
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1. Introduction
The passage of the Equal Pay Act 1970 was a landmark event in post-war British 
industrial relations, not simply for introducing a qualified right to pay equality between 
women and men but for breaching the principle that pay and conditions of employ-
ment should be determined by collective bargaining or other private contractual 
means, not by the state. Whilst the principle of legal support for the institutions of 
collective bargaining was well recognised at that point, and statutory minimum wages 
were set for sectors without effective voluntary arrangements, direct legislative modifi-
cation of pay and conditions was regarded as exceptional. Since the passage of the Act, 
the relationship between equal pay legislation and collective bargaining has continued 
to be complex and contested. As the coverage of collective bargaining declined, litiga-
tion over pay equity issues sharply increased, in particular over the decade starting in 
2003, but this is not a straightforward story of one form of regulation substituting for 
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another. The rise in litigation was concentrated in areas of the economy where collec-
tive bargaining retained a presence, principally in the public sector. The intervention of 
new actors in the form of claimants’ law firms, taking cases on a no-win, no-fee basis, 
changed the dynamics of the litigation process, with wider consequences for collective 
bargaining and for the effectiveness of legislation on gender equality.
In this article we review the causes and consequences of the rise in equal pay litiga-
tion in Britain during the 2000s. After an explanation of our methodological approach 
(Section 2), we assess the impact of changes in the legal framework which, on the one 
hand, opened up new types of legal claim and, on the other, provided the opportu-
nity for claimants’ law firms to enter a part of the market for legal services which had 
previously been dominated by public agencies and trade unions (Section 3). Next we 
examine litigation trends, assessing the importance of the leading cases for the devel-
opment of equal pay law, and the effectiveness of litigation in providing redress for 
litigants (Section 4). We take a closer look at the litigation strategies of the law firms 
and unions, respectively, and at the responses of unions and employers to the rise in 
claims, drawing on interview material (Section 5). Finally, we offer an evaluation of the 
recent litigation wave, with the focus on its implications for the stability and efficacy 
of the collective bargaining system (Section 6). We argue that litigation and collective 
bargaining are best regarded as complements, in the sense that litigation is unlikely 
to be effective in advancing an equality agenda in the absence of well-functioning 
arrangements for collective wage determination. Conversely, collective bargaining ‘in 
the shadow of the law’ is likely to lead to more egalitarian and equitable outcomes than 
would be obtained from a purely voluntarist approach based on the autonomy of the 
wage determination process. More generally, the recent British experience suggests 
that litigation can be a potent mechanism for advancing social rights.
2. Empirical analysis of equality law: questions, methods and data
Empirical analysis of the operation of equality laws has cast light on the limits of the law 
as a means of implementing a human rights agenda for social reform. On one hand, there 
is the potential for civil and social rights to be embedded in organisational practice via 
human resource management (HRM) processes; on the other, these same processes can 
lead to a channelling and possibly a weakening of the human rights perspective which 
initially informed the legal change (Edelman et al., 2001; Dobbin, 2009; Kirton and 
Greene, 2009, 2010). In their focus on HRM, these studies highlight one way by which 
legal rules, which are not self-enforcing, can be put into practice. At the same time, they 
leave open the possibility of other modes of implementation which are both more adver-
sarial in character and more contentious in their results. The recent experience of British 
equal pay litigation poses the question of how an adversarial approach to enforcement, 
based on repeated and confrontational litigation, operating alongside the setting of pay 
and conditions through collective bargaining, compares to the process which Dobbin 
(2009, p 3), writing of US civil rights legislation, describes in terms of ‘the personnel 
profession’s compliance efforts [translating] the law into practice’.
The empirical study of equality law, as of any other area of labour law, requires a 
multi-level approach that first identifies the regulatory ambit of the relevant legal rules 
and their reception by social actors, prior to making an assessment of the impact of the 
law on behaviour and outcomes (Deakin, 2011). Thus analysis of the scope of the law 
and of its formal regulatory content is needed to establish its rationale and intended 
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effects, but must be complemented by empirical research aimed at establishing the 
contours of the operation of the law at the level of litigation and enforcement, and its 
influence on actors’ strategies.
In this article we present a socio-legal analysis of the operation of equal pay 
law, which combines a narrative account of the development of legal doctrine with 
descriptive statistics on litigation trends, case studies of leading decisions and mate-
rial drawn from interviews with actors who played leading roles in the process by 
which the law played out in practice. To this end, we draw on a range of data sources. 
Data on litigation trends are drawn from annual records of employment tribunal 
statistics, published by the Employment Tribunal Service and its predecessors since 
the mid-1970s (ETS, various years). These statistical series provide data on the 
volume of claims and some general information on their outcomes (see Figures 1–4 
later) but next to no detail on particular cases. For these, we constructed our own 
dataset of leading decisions based on press reports (local and national press and 
specialist publications on labour and equality law) and the published texts of legal 
judgments (law reports). We identified around a dozen leading cases, initially from 
legal decisions and references to disputes in the national press, and then researched 
references to them in the local press and specialist publications (see Table 1 and 
Section 4.3). Finally, we conducted interviews with principal actors in equal pay 
litigation in the key period covered by the study in the late 2000s to establish their 
approaches to litigation, their attitudes towards the law and their assessment of its 
impact. The interviewees did not form a random sample; on the contrary, they were 
approached because of their roles in the events that are described in the article, 
although for reasons of confidentiality, individuals and their organisations are not 
identified by name. They were HR managers in six local authorities, officials of five 
trade unions involved in equal pay claims, and a solicitor in a claimants’ law firm 
focussing on equal pay litigation. Interviews were recorded and transcribed and 
coded manually using emergent categories (see Section 5).
3. The evolution of the legal framework governing equal pay in Britain
The Equal Pay Act 1970 was passed in the aftermath of strike action by women workers 
protesting about unequal terms and conditions. The most prominent of these disputes, 
involving the Ford Motor Company’s Dagenham Plant, arose out of terms and condi-
tions which had been collectively negotiated, as did a lengthy strike, shortly after the Act 
had come into force, at the Trico Folberth plant in Brentford in 1976 (Meehan, 1985). 
The principal remedy supplied by the Act took the form of a claim for equal pay before 
a labour court dealing with individual disputes (an ‘industrial tribunal’, later renamed 
‘employment tribunal’). The claimant was required to find a better paid ‘comparator’ of 
the opposite sex who worked in the same employment. Under the 1970 Act, the com-
parator had to be employed on a similar job (‘like work’) or on work which had been 
determined to be of equivalent value under a job evaluation scheme (‘job rated as equiv-
alent’). In addition, the Act provided for collective agreements to be amended through 
arbitration before a collective labour court (the Central Arbitration Committee) so as to 
bring them into line with the principle of equality (Deakin and Morris, 2012, para. 6.4).
The implementation of the Act was delayed for five years to allow for payment struc-
tures to be amended voluntarily. Prior to 1970 it was not unusual for the terms of 
collective agreements to make separate provision for female and male workers. This 
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type of ‘direct discrimination’ (discrimination formally based on gender) was largely 
removed during the period when the Act was being phased in. Average hourly wages 
for female workers, which had been around 60% of average male wages in 1970, had 
risen to 70% of the male average by 1976, a change subsequently attributed to the 
implementation of the equal pay principle through sector-level collective bargaining 
(Zabalza and Tzannatos, 1985).
In a 1979 ruling, Hy-Mac, ‘indirect discrimination’ arising from the application of 
rules or practices which were formally gender-neutral but had the effect of dispropor-
tionately benefitting workers of one sex over the other was held to be outside the remit 
of the collective arbitration provisions of the Act, effectively nullifying them. The ruling 
was successfully challenged before the European Court of Justice in 1982, but the UK 
government, which was by now committed to a policy of labour market deregulation, 
implemented the Court’s ruling in a minimalist fashion, replacing the power to re-align 
collective agreements according to the equality principle with a largely symbolic measure 
enabling a court to declare discriminatory agreements ‘void’. After this the emphasis in 
litigation turned to individual claims, the scope for which was enhanced in 1983 by the 
introduction of the right to equal pay for work of ‘equal value’ (in US terms, ‘compa-
rable worth’), again following a ruling of the Court of Justice. The equal pay principle 
had been embodied in a provision of the fundamental text of European Community 
law, the Treaty of Rome, and this enabled the Court to give an expansive reading to the 
content of sex discrimination law in a series of rulings from the mid-1970s to the late 
1990s. These decisions established, amongst other things, that individual claims could 
be brought with respect to ‘indirect’ sex discrimination, subject to an employer’s defence 
of ‘justification’ or (as it later became known) ‘proportionality’, which the Court tended 
to interpret restrictively, thereby putting the onus on employers to provide non-discrimi-
natory explanations for persistent inequalities (for further details on these legal changes, 
see Deakin and Morris, 2012, paras. 6.5, 6.80 and 6.106).
Notwithstanding the interventions of the Court of Justice, individual workers faced 
substantial obstacles to realising a successful equal pay claim. As it was no longer neces-
sary to find a fellow worker employed on ‘like work’ or ‘work rated as equivalent’, com-
parisons could be made across occupational boundaries, although not beyond the scope 
of employment units or even, in some instances, across different workplaces, unless those 
workplaces were governed by common terms and conditions, such as those deriving 
from a single collective agreement or a series of linked agreements. For an equal value 
claim to succeed, the tribunal had to be satisfied that the jobs of the claimant and her 
comparator were equivalent by reference to a cluster of factors relating to, amongst other 
things, the nature of the work and the qualifications of the job holders. Even if a finding 
of equal value was made by a court-appointed expert, the employer could fall back on 
one of a number of ‘genuine material factor’ defences, which referred to factors such as 
labour scarcity (‘market forces’) and seniority, although the use of collective bargaining 
to set pay and conditions was not in itself a defence (see Deakin and Morris, 2012, paras 
6.96-6.101). Partly because of the procedural complexity of claims, together with the 
scope for appeals on points of law and references to the Court of Justice for clarification 
on the meaning of European Union law, it was not unusual for the more high-profile 
equal value cases to take years to be resolved. The Enderby case, which involved compar-
ing the pay of speech therapists and clinical psychologists in the National Health Service, 
was litigated for over a decade. Extended litigation of this type was mostly financed 
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through funding from the government agency with responsibility for overseeing sex dis-
crimination law, the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC).1
In their review of discrimination law, published in 2000, Hepple, Coussey and 
Chowdhury concluded that ‘the equal value procedure has largely failed to deliver 
pay equity to women’ (Hepple et al., 2000, p 97). Between 1976 and 1998, just over 
12,300 equal pay claims had been registered with tribunals, of which only 20% were 
successful at a tribunal hearing or were settled in the claimant’s favour. The success 
rate for equal value claims requiring a report from an independent expert was lower 
at around 15%. The vast majority of the equal value claims were against public sector 
employers, in particular British Coal (then a state-owned enterprise) and the National 
Health Service. In 1998, a total of £3.4 million had been paid out to around 1,000 
successful female claimants. According to Hepple et  al., ‘although the settlements 
were significant for these women, they involved a long and expensive procedure at 
considerable public cost’. The study also doubted whether the equal value procedure 
had made any discernible impact on the gender pay gap (Hepple et al., 2000, 98).
Although the pace of legal change slowed after the mid-1990s, a further significant 
intervention of the Court of Justice occurred in 1998 when it ruled that the two-year 
limit on arrears in equal pay claims was contrary to the principle requiring effective 
remedies to be provided for breach of EU law rights (the Magorrian case). The effect 
of the Court’s ruling, which was brought into effect in the UK in the early 2000s, was 
to substitute a six-year time period for arrears of wages, aligning equal pay law with the 
normal period of limitation of claims for breach of contract (Deakin and Morris, 2012, 
para. 6.103). This change in the law was triggered by cases arising from the exclusion 
of female part-time workers from occupational pension schemes, and its significance 
for collective bargaining was not immediately appreciated. It was to prove important in 
providing the context for the entry of no-win, no-fee law firms into equal pay litigation 
because it greatly enhanced the scale of the compensation that could be made available 
to claimants who could show that they had been the victims of historical discrimination.2
A further change in the law, in this case governing the financing of civil litigation, 
helped create the conditions for the entry of no-win, no-fee law firms. English law has 
traditionally been hostile to contingent fees of the kind that have long been accepted in 
the USA, under which the successful parties pay their legal representatives a fee calcu-
lated as a percentage of the winnings, but a version of the contingent fee, known as the 
conditional fee, was introduced in 1990, and from 2000 it became possible to recover 
success fees from costs paid by the losing party. The regulations governing conditional 
fees were relaxed in 2005 in a way that further expanded the scope for their use. These 
changes were associated with a government policy of encouraging private financing of 
litigation to reduce use of public funds to support the costs of claims through the legal 
aid system.3 Their application to the employment context was somewhat fortuitous 
1 The EOC was merged into a new body, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), from 
2006.
2 A further series of changes to equal pay law occurred in 2010, with the consolidation of the Equal Pay 
Act 1970 into a wider Equality Act. There were relatively few changes to the substance of equal pay law at this 
point and they do not affect the litigation described in the article, which was initiated under the 1970 Act.
3 After 2010, following a review undertaken by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government 
which took office in that year, a number of changes to civil litigation procedures were made that reduced 
the attractiveness of no-win, no-fee arrangements to claimants and lawyers. In particular, from 2010 the fee 
charged by the claimant’s lawyer in employment tribunal cases was capped at 35% of damages, and from 
2013 it was no longer possible for the success fee to be recovered from the losing party. See Ministry of 
Justice (2015).
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and was most likely unintended, since legal aid was not generally available at that time 
(or since) for employment tribunal claims.4
4. The rise of equal pay litigation: main trends, sectoral context and 
leading cases
4.1 General litigation trends
Figure 1 shows long-term trends in equal pay litigation. In the first years of the equal 
pay jurisdiction, a few hundred applications a year on average were registered by indus-
trial tribunals. By the early 1980s, as the scope for claims under the ‘like work’ and 
‘work rated as equivalent’ headings was gradually exhausted, the number had fallen to 
no more than a few dozen. With the enactment of the new equal value jurisdiction from 
the mid-1980s, the volume of registrations returned to the levels of the 1970s. There 
was a further increase to the level of several thousand claims a year at the end of the 
1990s, around the time that European law began to have a major impact on the rights 
of part-time workers excluded from occupational pension protection. The next major 
increase occurs in the mid-2000s and is associated with the entry of no-win, no-fee law 
firms and with the mass claims that they and others, including trade unions, launched 
against public sector employers in the local government and health service sectors. 
The volume of claims spikes in 2007–8 at over 60,000; by 2012–13 it had fallen back 
to around 20,000 a year.
Figure 2 compares the number of equal pay claims with the total number of claims 
registered before employment tribunals across all relevant jurisdictions in the period 
from the late 1990s to the present. Although there has been a steady increase in the 
volume of total claims across this period, the trend in equal pay claims did not keep 
pace with the general increase until the late 1990s, and has generally followed a pattern 
of its own. Thus the rise in equal pay claims does not appear to be a simple function 
of a wider increase in claims across this period. The rise in overall claims is in part a 
result of the availability of new types of claim, in particular those relating to working 
time protection, which were introduced after 1998.
Nor is there a straightforward relationship between the increase in the volume of 
equal pay claims and the decline in collective bargaining coverage over this period. 
The combined coverage of collective agreements and related forms of collective wage 
determination, including orders or wages councils and other statutory bodies, peaked 
at over 80% in 1979 and has been falling at a steady rate ever since. By the late 1990s it 
stood at just over 40% and in 2011 was down to below 25% (Ewing and Hendy, 2013). 
Equal pay litigation, however, did not begin a steep and sustained rate of increase until 
the mid-2000s, well after the decline in collective bargaining coverage had set in.
The decline in collective bargaining coverage and the rise of individualised employ-
ment litigation can be understood as related aspects of a larger, long-term shift in the 
nature of the British industrial relations system. There has been a move away from 
reliance on self-regulation by unions and management as the principal mechanism 
4 A further change in government policy which took effect in 2013 was the imposition of fees on claim-
ants bringing claims to employment tribunals, a move designed to reduce employment litigation rates (see 
Hepple, 2013). This change falls outside the period of our study. The early signs are that there has been a 
sizeable fall (70%) in the number of claims before employment tribunals across all categories, with equal pay 
claims seeing falls of around 80% for some quarters (see Ministry of Justice, 2014).
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for determining pay and conditions and resolving disputes, towards a rights-centred 
and law-driven system (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2011). Had state policy continued to 
support multi-employer collective bargaining after 1979, it is likely that the collective 
arbitration mechanisms for aligning collective agreements with the equal pay principle 
would have been renewed in an effective form after the European Court judgment of 
1982. If this step had been taken, implementation of pay equality through collective 
bargaining might have continued throughout the 1980s and beyond much as it had 
done in the 1970s, where it proved effective in narrowing the gender pay gap (Zabalza 
and Tzannatos, 1985). In this sense it could be argued that the decline in the effective-
ness of collective agreements as a source of regulation, coupled with the ending of state 
support for the institutions of multi-employer bargaining, were necessary conditions 
for the later rise in equal pay litigation, even if the timing of that rise was contingent 
on a number of institutional factors, including those which prompted the increase in 
conditional fee litigation in the mid-2000s.
However, it cannot be assumed that as collective bargaining declined as a form of 
regulation, litigation on equal pay (or any other employment law jurisdiction, for that 
matter) was simply substituted for it. This is because the rise in equal pay claims has 
been focussed in those sectors of the economy where sector-level collective bargaining 
remained effective, particularly in the public sector. This trend, identified by Hepple 
et al. (2000) in the late 1990s, remained strong in the 2000s, as we shall now see.
4.2 Mass litigation in the local authority sector
4.2.1 Background: the implementation of single status in local government employment. The 
rise in equal pay claims which began in 2004–5 saw a near doubling of claims to reach 
over 8,000 a year, and peaked with over 60,000 claims in 2007–8. This increase was 
almost entirely located in just two sectors, local government and public health services, 
with the local authority sector leading the way. The catalyst for the rise in litigation in 
the local government litigation was a series of long-running disputes over the imple-
mentation of a national-level collective agreement, the ‘single status agreement’ or 
SSA. Between 2004 and 2008, the trade union Unison supported over 40,000 equal 
pay claims by its members, the large majority in relation to the SSA (Jaffe et al., 2008), 
and the GMB union supported around 30,000 (GMB, 2015). Claimants’ law firms are 
reported to have taken a further 30,000 claims in this period (Gibson, 2013).
The catalyst for the SSA was equal pay litigation supported by trade unions in the 
first half of the 1990s, involving female canteen workers whose pay had been cut as a 
result of a compulsory competitive tendering exercise. The House of Lords (then the 
UK’s highest appellate court) ruled in 1995 that the ‘market forces’ defence was not 
available to the claimant’s employer simply on the grounds that unless wages were 
cut, the contract to supply the services in question would have been lost (the North 
Yorkshire case). The implication of this ruling and a related decision, Cleveland, when 
coupled with the application of the legal principle that employees’ ‘acquired rights’ 
would be preserved upon a transfer of employment arising from outsourcing, was that 
the national agreement for local government employees would operate as a floor of 
rights, binding local authorities themselves where they kept services in house, as well 
as external contractors. The Cleveland case was eventually settled in the mid-2000s for 
sums reported to be between £6 million and £7 million.
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The SSA, which was concluded in 1997, sought to streamline local authority pay-
ment structures and minimise the risk of future equal value claims by bringing together 
the terms and conditions of employment of manual workers (previously covered by an 
agreement known in England and Wales as the ‘White Book’) and those of administra-
tive, professional, technical and clerical workers (APT&C, previously covered by the 
‘Purple Book’). The SSA put in place a national single spine pay structure (known as 
the ‘Green Book’).5
Under the SSA, each job was to be evaluated at local level using a locally agreed job 
evaluation scheme. An earlier job evaluation under the White Book had been carried 
out in 1987, but it had ignored the effect of bonus schemes, which had tended to ben-
efit workers in male-dominated grades by, on average, up to 30% of basic pay. While 
these bonuses had at some earlier point been related to productivity, monitoring of 
Fig. 2. Equal pay claims and all employment tribunal claims, 1998–2013
Source: Employment Tribunal Service, Employment Tribunal Statistics, various years.
Fig. 1. Equal pay claims, 1976–2013
Source: Employment Tribunal Service, Employment Tribunal Statistics, various years
5 Variants of these collective agreements, with different labels and terminology, operated in Scotland.
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performance had generally ceased and, as later litigation made clear (see Section 4.3), 
they had come to be seen as forming part of basic pay.
The SSA was designed as a framework agreement which was to be implemented 
locally. Despite the significance of the issue of single status for potential equal pay 
claims, few implementation agreements were struck at local level during the first five 
years of the SSA’s operation. Given the slow pace of implementation, a new national-
level agreement, the National Joint Council Pay Implementation Agreement, was 
made in 2004, setting a deadline of April 2006 for job evaluations to be completed and 
a further one of March 2007 for the new payment system to be in place. However, only 
half of the almost 400 local authorities in England and Wales had fully implemented 
the agreement by this point.
Those local authorities that did implement the SSA within the first few years appear 
to have avoided the litigation and back pay issues that occurred at many other coun-
cils. Of the six local authorities we interviewed for this research between late 2008 and 
early 2010, only one had completed the process early, and this council had experienced 
no litigation or back pay issues. Four of the local authorities we spoke to had faced 
litigation or the threat of litigation from both trade unions and lawyers representing 
individual claimants. One authority had yet to start the job evaluation process at the 
time of our interviews.
Trade unions and employer representatives we interviewed put the long delay 
between the negotiation of the SSA and its implementation in many local authori-
ties down to a number of factors. First, the process of implementation involved a 
detailed job evaluation of every post in each local authority and the parties needed 
to reach agreement about which evaluation tool they would use as well as the details 
of the process of evaluation. In large local authorities, evaluating every post was a 
fairly onerous procedure, and the process had to allow time for appeals. Thus, it could 
take several years. Many councils began their evaluations using paper-based systems, 
which were slow and cumbersome, and it was not until computerised systems became 
available that the process could be speeded up. Some councils used the opportunity 
provided by single status to deal with other, long-standing HRM issues and bring in a 
range of changes, so that negotiation over the implementation of single status became 
enmeshed with a wider reform agenda. Rather than the process of job evaluation being 
completed at a national level around job profiles, each local authority had to conduct 
its own job evaluation process. As one interviewee described it, every local authority 
had to ‘reinvent the wheel’ despite the fact there was much commonality across them 
amongst the roles their employees performed.
Second, pilot projects conducted in the first few years revealed that the implementa-
tion of single status was likely to have significant impacts for some employees’ existing 
terms and conditions and for the financial stability of local authorities. For a significant 
proportion of workers (up to 40% in some local authorities) there were likely to be 
sizeable pay cuts, particularly once bonus systems were removed. As one HR manager 
told us, unions representing manual workers could see that ‘their members were going 
to be hammered’. Pay cuts were something that many union officials had not factored 
into their negotiation positions, even though advice given to officials by Unison in 
1997 and the GMB, TGWU and Unison combined in 1998 had indicated that this was 
a possibility and that union officials should negotiate pay protection arrangements for 
a ‘reasonable period’ for those negatively impacted by grading reviews (Unison, 1997: 
GMB et al., 1998).
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For most of the officials interviewed as part of our research, the issue of pay cuts was 
something that they and their members struggled to come to terms with. As one noted, 
‘putting in front of people a proposal which results in the pay cut for anyone of any order 
is difficult . . . [they will say] I didn’t join the trade union and pay you £10 a month [for] 
you to negotiate a pay cut’. Initially many union officials tried to negotiate for lifetime 
protection for any employee whose pay was to be reduced. Many local authorities, on 
the other hand, aimed to negotiate settlements in which pay increases for the ‘winners’ 
would be offset as far as possible by pay decreases for the ‘losers’, thereby minimis-
ing the overall increase in the expenditure on wages and salaries. Thus in many local 
authorities the negotiations were slow and fractious, and in some cases they simply broke 
down. As one union official noted, the unions had assumed that the SSA ‘would lead to 
local authorities putting serious resources’ aside for its implementation, but this ‘largely 
didn’t happen’. A number of employers we interviewed reported deliberately holding 
back on negotiating further once the pilot studies revealed the extent of potential change 
for them, because of fear of significant industrial unrest and the impact on employee 
morale. In addition, some local authorities reported deliberately delaying the process so 
as to allow others to go first: ‘it was let’s sit and watch them make some mistakes and 
learn from them’. Unions also reported being ‘fobbed off’ in their attempts to engage 
employers in negotiations. The feeling was that some local government administrations 
had other priorities in the political cycle and adopted something of an ‘ostrich position’ 
around equal pay and single status.
4.2.2 Litigation arising from the local government SSA. The most prominent no-win, 
no-fee law firm to operate in the equal pay sector during the 2000s was Stefan Cross 
Solicitors, a Newcastle-based firm which was established in 2003. Its founder, Stefan 
Cross, had previously worked as a specialist in personal injury litigation for the leading 
claimants’ law firm Thompsons, and had been a trade union activist since his teens. When 
acting for the unions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, he had taken a prominent role in 
the Cleveland litigation. Stefan Cross Solicitors accepted its first cases in March 2003 and 
a year later was processing 100 claims. By 2008 it had 30,000 cases on its books.6
Claims brought in relation to the implementation of the SSA were of four main 
types (see McLaughlin, 2014). First, claimants sued for back pay in relation to past 
inequalities which the non-implementation or inadequate implementation of the SSA 
had failed to deal with. These most often took the form of claims arising from the pay-
ment of unjustified bonuses to workers in male-dominated grades. This type of claim 
was described to us by a claimants’ lawyer in the following terms:
pay differentials in [a particular local authority] are so huge that they are using [the argument] 
‘we’re looking after the women’ and actually it’s a cloak for we don’t want huge pay cuts for our 
men. We’ve got a position in [this council], a grade five refuse driver, who on a national pay scale 
is £12,000, gets £26,500, he gets paid more than social workers and newly qualified solicitors 
in [this council]. So they’ve got a 125% effective bonus arrangement.
A second type of claim arose from ‘pay protection schemes’ under which the pay of 
more highly paid workers was maintained at an artificially high level for a certain 
period after the implementation of the SSA, thereby perpetuating historical differences 
6 Stefan Cross Solicitors entered into voluntary liquidation in 2013 on the basis that the cases it was 
pursuing had largely been settled. Fox Cross Solicitors and Action4Equality Scotland, other firms in which 
Stefan Cross had an interest, continued to operate in Scotland.
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that favoured the male-dominated grades. A third legal strategy was to challenge the 
job evaluation schemes put in place at local level as part of the process of implementing 
the SSA, where it could be shown that they had a tendency to discriminate (see Wright, 
2011; Gilbert, 2012). Finally, challenges were mounted to ‘job enrichment schemes’ 
under which job descriptions were redefined in an allegedly discriminatory manner. 
This was described in the following manner by the claimants’ lawyer we interviewed:
The other brilliant device they’ve invented is to change the jobs altogether. Under the White 
Book scheme you have four grades of cook and four grades of gardener. Under the Green Book 
almost universally they have one grade of gardener and they call them something else, they’ll call 
them environmental operative, and they will score the job of the environmental operative on a 
theoretical basis and then they will apply a whole load of jobs to this new grade of environmental 
operative. . . . So the grade 1 gardener, the grade 2 gardener, disappear altogether and they end 
up being an environmental operative. Now what they don’t do, they don’t do that for kitchen 
staff. They don’t create a new grade of kitchen operative, or catering operative, they stay and get 
evaluated job by job and hey presto they’re still at the bottom. In fact what’s happened in a lot of 
areas is that they’ve actually created a desert of no male jobs in the lower grades.
A further type of claim, which was rarely pursued but gave rise to more controversy 
than any other, took the form of actions against trade unions which had negotiated 
agreements that were indirectly discriminatory (Deakin and Morris, 2012, para 6.100). 
Unions could be sued under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 for committing discrim-
inatory acts. In the Allen v. GMB litigation, the courts held that this provision could be 
invoked to supply compensation to workers who had suffered losses as a result of the 
union’s involvement in concluding a collective agreement that preserved discrimina-
tory practices or sought to compromise or qualify claims for historical inequalities. The 
union argued as its defence that its bargaining strategy was justified by a number of 
considerations, including the need to balance the needs of different workforce groups 
amongst its membership. After a number of appeals this argument was rejected, on the 
basis, amongst others, that officials had acted against the interests of the union’s female 
members by concealing information from them and pressuring them to settle claims 
prematurely. The Allen litigation prompted employers in subsequent cases to seek con-
tribution from unions in respect of liabilities arising from discriminatory agreements, 
and to put forward union involvement as the basis for a genuine material factor (GMF) 
defence. These tactics were largely unsuccessful, with the courts eventually coming 
round to the view that responsibility for discriminatory payment structures would in 
most situations lie with the employer. The Allen case came to be seen as somewhat 
exceptional, but only after a period of several years during which unions faced a novel 
and open-ended litigation risk.
The claims made in relation to the SSA were at least as complex to bring as the types 
of claim that had featured in the litigation wave of the 1980s and 1990s. Establishing 
equal value in the first place could require either an independent report or lengthy 
deliberations by the tribunal, and employers would seek to rely on the GMF defence to 
justify pay protection and job enrichment schemes. Legal uncertainties arising from the 
novel nature of some of the claims meant that obtaining a clear ruling on the scope of 
the GMF defence could delay consideration of the merits of a claim by months or years.
The rapid rise in cases registered did not translate into immediate litigation success. 
Figures 3 and 4 show trends in registrations and disposals of equal pay cases in the 
period from 2007, when cases brought following the initial rise in mass claims began 
to be decided. Disposals have generally run well below the level of registrations, and 
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very few result in a final judgment in favour of the claimants. In 2009–10 and 2010–11 
only 1% of disposals took the form of a judgment in the claimants’ favour; the reported 
success rate before tribunals in 2008–9, 2009–10 and 2012–13 was 0. A substantial 
number of claims were settled with the aid of the conciliation and arbitration service 
ACAS (37% in 2011–12 and 27% in 2012–13). Of those that were withdrawn (43% in 
2011–12 and 50% in 2012–13), a substantial proportion are likely to have resulted in a 
payment of some kind being made to claimants. Official statistical series do not indicate 
whether withdrawn applications led to a settlement, but it is likely that many of them 
did. Table 1 sets out in synoptic form the features of some of the most important equal 
pay cases decided in this period, most of which arose under the SSA. As the table shows, 
by contrast to the disposal figures just mentioned, claimants in these leading cases were 
generally successful in the legal arguments that they put forward and in obtaining com-
pensation. Some of these claims were continuing at the time of writing (January 2015), 
as further appeals were pursued or additional legal points raised.
Fig. 3. Equal pay claims and disposals, 2007–2013
Source: Employment Tribunal Service, Employment Tribunal Statistics, various years.
Fig. 4. Disposals of equal pay claims by type (percentages)
Source: Employment Tribunal Service, Employment Tribunal Statistics, various years.
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Table 1. Leading cases on equal pay, 2005–14: claimants, issues, results and liabilities
Case Claimants and 
representatives
Legal issue Result Liabilities and 
costs
Wilson v. North 
Cumbria NHS 
Trust (2005)
1,600 claimants; 
UNISON, GMB
Scope of 
comparison
Judgment 
for claimants 
on scope of 
comparison 
issue
£300 million in 
back pay, some 
individual claims 
worth £200,000
Allen v. GMB 
(2008)
5 named 
claimants, others 
added later; 
Stefan Cross 
Solicitors
Union liable 
for negotiating 
discriminatory 
collective 
agreement
Union found 
to have 
concealed 
information 
from members 
and pressured 
them to settle 
claims
Press reports 
compensation 
of £100 million, 
figures disputed 
by unions
Redcar and 
Cleveland BC 
v. Bainbridge, 
Middlesborough 
BC v. Surtees 
(2008)
Small number 
of test cases, 
>2,000 affected 
workers; Stefan 
Cross Solicitors
Pay protection No automatic 
justification for 
pay protection; 
employer 
must consider 
historical 
context
Press reports 
of legal costs 
of £292,000 
in 2008–9 
by Cleveland 
BC. Council’s 
summary 
of accounts 
2007–08 shows 
capitalisation of 
equal pay costs 
as £2.9 million
Slack v. Cumbria 
CC (2009)
3,000 claims; 
Stefan Cross 
representing 
70%
Time limits Court gives 
broad reading 
to ‘stable 
employment’ 
test
Council offer to 
settle for £40 
million, £21 
million in claims 
settled by 2009. 
Council accounts 
in 2009–10 
made provision 
for a further 
£4.677 million 
in back pay. In 
2013 ongoing 
schools claims 
alone estimated 
to amount to 
£2.436 million
Hartley 
v. Northumbria 
NHS Trust (2009)
10,500 
claimants; Stefan 
Cross Solicitors
JES under Agenda 
for Change; pay 
protection
ET upholds 
JES and union 
negotiation 
strategy
NHS Trust 
reported to 
have spent 
£3.3 million on 
litigation
Nicholls 
v. Coventry CC 
(2009)
643 claims; 500 
represented by 
UNISON
Material factor 
defence
EAT rejected 
union 
liability, 
stressed pay 
a matter for 
the employer
Press reports 
estimate 
compensation 
as £64 million
(Continued )
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4.3.3 Case study 1: Birmingham City Council. The litigation in Birmingham was the 
most high profile of the cases pursued in the course of the litigation wave of the 
2000s, involving over 4,000 claims. Single status was introduced on 1 April 2008 with 
retrospective effect to 1 April 2007, but only in relation to non-schools employees. 
The schools transition occurred later. The litigation focussed around six compara-
tor groups, with the focus on two male-dominated grades, the Fleet and Waste and 
Highways comparators. These workers’ bonuses were removed on 8 August 2008 and 
31 December 2008, respectively.
The first tranche of tribunal litigation took place in March and April 2009 and was 
concerned with arguments that the claims were either out of time or should alter-
natively be struck out for non-compliance with rules (in force at the time the claims 
arose but since repealed) governing exhaustion of remedies under internal grievance 
Case Claimants and 
representatives
Legal issue Result Liabilities and 
costs
Bridges v. Bury 
MBC (2012) 
(joined with 
Brennan 
v. Sunderland at 
CA level)
1,200 claimants Bonus scheme; pay 
protection
Bonus scheme 
failed, pay 
protection 
upheld
Council criticised 
for spending 
£662,000 on 
external legal 
fees, threatens 
job cuts. Claims 
started in 2007, 
settled in 2012
Barker v.  
Birmingham CC 
(2010)
Abdulla 
v. Birmingham 
CC (2013)
4,000 claimants; 
Stefan Cross 
Solicitors
Thompsons 
solicitors
Leigh, Day & Co
Bonus scheme; 
material factor 
defence
Bonus scheme 
failed due 
to lack of 
transparency, 
material factor 
defence failed
Claims can be 
brought in the 
county court 
6 years after 
termination of 
employment
Liabilities of £1 
billion reported. 
In 2014 council 
contemplating 
asset sales to 
meet costs of 
claims
South  
Lanarkshire 
Council v. Russell 
(2012)
2,400 claimants; 
Fox Cross 
Solicitors, Action 
4 Equality 
Scotland
Red Book, council 
opting out of 
national JES
Council 
failed to show 
justification for 
route involving 
opting out 
of national 
scheme
Press reports 
suggest overall 
liabilities of £100 
million
Brennan 
v. Sunderland CC 
(2012)
Around 1,200 
claimants; Stefan 
Cross Solicitors
Bonuses, JES, 
union role in 
negotiation 
collective 
agreement
Bonuses not 
clearly enough 
linked to 
productivity
Press reports 
estimate 
compensation of 
£30 million for 
claimants
Source: Authors’ dataset compiled from press reports and reports of legal judgments.
Table 1. Continued
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procedures. Further complications arose from the possibility of duplicate claims, from 
arguments that claimants had mis-described their jobs, and dispute over the compari-
son of employees in non-teaching roles in community schools to employees in other 
council establishments. These issues were appealed from the initial tribunal determi-
nation, first to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) in 2010, and then to the Court 
of Appeal in 2012. Meanwhile, separate appeals were being heard on procedural issues 
arising from the constitution of the initial tribunal hearing which dealt with the GMF 
defence and eventually on the validity of that defence itself. The employment tribunal 
finally ruled in the claimants’ favour, finding that the bonus scheme operated by the 
council was not transparent, with the result that the GMF defence failed.
In tandem with this litigation, the council was also facing claims in the regular courts 
(the County and High Courts) from claimants who were out of time to bring their 
cases before an employment tribunal. These claims were eventually appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which ruled in 2012 that the normal six-year limitation period for 
breach of contract actions would apply to claims brought before the County or High 
Court, thereby circumventing the six-month time limit for claims before tribunals (the 
Abdulla case).
In an attempt to avoid future equal pay liabilities, the council then sought to change 
the terms and conditions of its entire workforce. Employees who did not accept the 
new, non-discriminatory terms were dismissed and re-engaged. This led to two addi-
tional forms of claims: claims by various unions for compensation in relation to the 
council’s failure to consult over the dismissals, and unfair dismissal claims by individu-
als who had had their terms and conditions forcibly changed. The claims by the unions 
were resolved while the majority of the unfair dismissal claims were withdrawn; the 
remaining claims were lost by the individuals with costs awarded against them. The 
employer’s attempt to force through changes to terms and conditions led to industrial 
action by the Fleet and Waste teams. Between 20 December 2010 and 12 January 
2011, approximately 450 refuse loaders undertook discontinuous industrial action 
involving half-day strikes and working to rule, at least in part by way of a response to 
the ending of bonuses.
In its Annual Audit letter 2011–12 published in November 2012 after the Supreme 
Court decision in Abdulla, the council recorded that its accounts from 2006–7 to 
2011–12 reflected combined actual and potential equal pay settlements totalling £757 
million. These sums included ‘second-generation’ claims that were anticipated follow-
ing the success of the initial cases. The Audit Letter noted that ‘the affordability of 
this presents a major challenge to the Council.’ In January 2014, following further 
legal defeats, the Council indicated that it might have to sell a number of major assets, 
including an international conference centre, to meet its liabilities.
4.3.4 Case study 2: Sunderland City Council. The first claims against Sunderland City 
Council were lodged in 2004. By the end of the litigation there were around 1,186 claim-
ants, although the precise numbers fluctuated throughout. The first generic claim form 
was settled in 2007 and the first substantive tribunal hearings commenced in 2008, on 
the issue of whether the council had a GMF defence. These hearings entailed 30 days 
of evidence after which the claimants had succeeded across the board and the council’s 
defence was held to be a sham. During 2008 there were also three separate EAT hear-
ings dealing with more procedural aspects of the litigation in addition to an appeal on the 
GMF ruling, which was then further appealed to the Court of Appeal (the Brennan case). 
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During 2009 and 2010 the tribunal dealt with the separate issue of the validity of the job 
evaluation scheme adopted by the employer under the SSA. One hundred twenty-five 
days of litigation ensued, during which around 30,000 pages of documents were disclosed 
by the council to the claimants. Final argument on this aspect of the case was heard over 
three days in January 2011 with approximately 500 pages of submissions from each side. 
In February 2012 the claimants’ challenge to the job evaluation scheme was upheld.
There were further EAT hearings during this time. On 16 and 17 November 2011 
the issue of a claim in contribution and disclosure of settlement agreements with the 
unions was considered, and on 1 February 2012 the EAT overturned a tribunal deci-
sion striking out various claims in which employees sought to rely on different com-
parators to those identified in internal grievance hearings.
All the claims by those instructing Stefan Cross Solicitors were settled by around 
2012. Thus for many claimants, the process of obtaining compensation for the pay 
disparities had taken eight years. The case went to the EAT on six occasions, as well as 
giving rise to a hearing on a complex point of law before the Court of Appeal.
5. Attitudes towards negotiation, litigation and fairness
We now draw on our interview material to provide further information on the moti-
vations of the principal actors, their views of the litigation and negotiation strategies 
they and their counterparties were pursuing, and their perceptions of the fairness of 
outcomes.
5.1 Litigation versus negotiation?
Opinions differ on whether the intervention of no-win, no-fee law firms changed the 
approach of trade unions to dealing with local authority employers, to the extent of 
inducing them to use litigation to a greater extent. The advice given by Unison in 
1997 on implementing single status had argued that ‘negotiation is better than litiga-
tion’, but it also noted that ‘where employers delay unnecessarily, it should be made 
clear that they are opening themselves to equal pay challenges’ (Unison, 1997, p 6). 
However, litigation was seen as a matter of last resort. As one regional union official 
explained to us, in relation to employer intransigence:
You can only put a certain amount of pressure on, because there was no compunction on the 
employers to move forward quickly on this, there was absolutely no reason in the world at this 
stage why they should move forward. Could we compel them to do so in the end? All we could 
do is talk, correspond, shout a little bit, stamp our little feet . . . we couldn’t say right, we’re going 
on strike because you won’t talk to us, it just wouldn’t happen, it just was impossible.
The explanation given to us for the unions’ reluctance to initiate litigation was twofold. 
First, ‘litigation won’t deliver equal pay. [Only] negotiation will deliver equal pay’. 
Achieving equal pay was seen as a matter for joint regulation, with unions and employ-
ers together conducting the job evaluation process and implementing the resulting pay 
structure. According to this argument, litigation could deliver back pay, but not equal 
pay. Some argued that the focus on back pay that arose from litigation initiated by 
claimants’ law firms distracted employers from considering the wider picture. As one 
national union official argued: ‘we are not going to see that the intervention of no win, 
no fee lawyers has led to any significant narrowing of the gender pay gap. . . . Single 
status will have had a much greater impact’. Additionally, unions accused claimant 
law firms of ‘parasitic’ behaviour in acting on the back of completed phases of the job 
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evaluation scheme conducted by employers and unions. This enabled them to take 
claims on the basis of ‘work rated equivalent’ rather than the more complex ‘equal 
value’ claims: ‘no win, no fee lawyers have not been keen to pursue equal value claims 
because of the uncertainty, because it’s not easy to predict what the outcome is going 
to be, and because of the length of time those cases have taken’.
Second, unions argued that litigation increased employer intransigence, pointing to 
cases in which employers had chosen to fight them at every stage, dragging out the pro-
cess over years. One official pointed to the Enderby case, which had taken 14 years to 
be completed in the 1990s, and to litigation against Cumbria council, which involved 
3,000 female workers in over eight years of litigation in the 2000s. They also argued 
that many of the local authority equal pay cases which were being litigated at the time 
of this interview (2010) were far from clear-cut, and that even when claims were, in 
their view, clearly justified, some employers continued to fight them.
Third, the union officials we spoke to rejected the claim (widely circulated in the 
British media at the time of the Allen decision) that they had been slow to act prior to 
the intervention of Stefan Cross Solicitors. One union official told us that there had 
been internal debate in his union in the early 2000s about whether to litigate and ‘the 
view was that we need to reach negotiated settlement . . . to deliver equal pay’. Another 
union official accepted that procrastination and inertia could explain the first few years 
of inaction, and that in the early 2000s more use should have been made of the threat 
of litigation. However, this respondent suggested that after 2003, independently of the 
entry of no-win, no-fee law firms, unions had begun to make greater use of the threat of 
litigation and had issued equal pay questionnaires, designed to force employers to dis-
close information on payment structures with a view to bringing a claim, to get employ-
ers to engage in serious negotiation in cases where they had previously refused to do so.
Union officials also regarded some of the litigation that they were engaged in as 
unhelpful. They saw themselves as having been forced into litigation in the middle 
of jointly conducted job evaluations to prevent their members being enticed away 
by potentially generous back pay settlements from no-win, no-fee law firms. Some 
employer respondents also referred to HR resources being diverted away from the job 
evaluation process to address litigation issues.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in favour of the claim against the union in the 
Allen litigation was seen as having had a fundamental impact on the position of the 
different players in the equal pay negotiation and litigation context. The tribunal held 
that whilst it was legitimate for the union to attempt to balance a range of conflicting 
interests, the means used had not been proportionate. The tribunal found that there 
had been a practice ‘which involved persuading those who had [equal pay] claims to 
take less than they were worth [or] . . . not to bring them at all’. The tribunal noted 
‘how much care, effort and discussion went into pay protection and how little went 
into back pay’. The tribunal considered that the female claimants had been placed ‘in 
a position where they were in fear that, if they pressed for more, it might lead to job 
losses and their being seen as traitors by their colleagues’. The tribunal was also critical 
of the union for accepting at face value the employer’s ‘plea of poverty’.
The union respondents we spoke to argued that the GMB had agreed to a low back 
pay settlement to deal with past pay inequalities not to prioritise pay protection but to 
avoid potential job losses through outsourcing and service cuts. They suggested that 
in the wake of the Allen ruling, unions had become hesitant to endorse agreements 
with employers over back pay and had advised their members to reject offers that 
they would have otherwise considered reasonable. Union respondents also pointed to 
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additional negotiation costs arising from Allen; officials reported taking advice from 
lawyers at every stage of the negotiation process and to be referring agreements to 
national level to be checked. This was a view confirmed by an employer respondent 
who said, ‘irrespective of the ins and outs of that case [Allen], the trade unions are 
worried about doing a deal with the employer’. Union officials argued that the overall 
effect of Allen would be to slow down the implementation of single status. They felt 
uncomfortable more generally with levels of litigation which ran counter to the tradi-
tional focus on achieving collective solutions:
If we are saying that an individual doesn’t like the collective settlement and then exerts their 
individual right over the collective good and that’s allowed to continue, then there is no such 
thing . . . as collective agreements and trade unions cease to have a purpose to exist and I am 
going to retrain as a lawyer.
By contrast, the law firm representative we spoke to questioned the effectiveness of the union 
approach to getting employers to engage in collective bargaining. He argued that unions 
tended to litigate strategically, that is, on a selective basis, and often with ulterior motives:
You have to ask yourself the question well why did they pursue cases in only 12 out of the 400 
local authorities when the pay structures at least under the White Book and the Purple Book 
were national, they were national pay scales and national agreements. If there’s a problem in St 
Helens there’s also a problem in Manchester, and if there’s a problem in Cleveland there’s a 
problem in Warwickshire, and they pursued the Warwickshire case but don’t pursue any of the 
other cases. And the answer is because there’s always an underlying dispute and unless they have 
another dispute they won’t pursue any other issues. That’s where the opportunity arose for [no-
win, no-fee law firms which] knew they had all these potential issues not being pursued.
Second he viewed unions as excessively conservative in their approach to pay bargain-
ing, as favouring the status quo and hence being unwilling to countenance altering 
radical changes to existing pay structures:
They will do absolutely everything to ensure that the status quo is maintained and that is their 
negotiating strategy, that’s the way they’ve approached single status, that’s the way they’ve 
approached everything to do with this. Although the documents and the policy says it’s designed 
to deal with equality issues, the reality is that . . . if [they] can’t maintain the status quo [they’d] 
rather not deal with it, otherwise what’s the explanation for [the unions’ line] which is we will 
negotiate rather than litigate.
Third he rejected the claim that litigation undermined collective bargaining, 
arguing that
the fact that somebody succeeded in pursuing the cases was the log jam to get the single status 
agreement in place, which is ironic when people now claim that pursuing equal pay cases is a 
hindrance to collective bargaining when in fact the truth is it’s exactly the opposite, equal pay 
cases are a catalyst in proper equal pay bargaining, and in fact the refusal of the unions to actu-
ally pursue these cases is why 11 years after they made the agreement they still haven’t done it, 
because you’ll find you’ve put in the claims and suddenly the employers start acting . . . a lot 
faster than they were acting before. So it was the combination.
Relatedly, he argued that unions would only litigate thanks to the competition pro-
vided by independent law firms:
Well they continue to essentially act on our coat tails in the vast majority of cases. There still isn’t 
in most areas an initiative, otherwise you’d find [it], if you just look at the [employment tribunal 
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statistics], just look at the ACAS stats, and look at the areas where we act and where we don’t act, 
and see how many equal pay cases are submitted in the south west, how many equal pay cases 
in the south, how many equal pay cases in London. If the unions have got a national strategy it 
shouldn’t make any difference, they should have the same strategy everywhere.
5.2 Equal pay or fair pay?
Back pay had not been a part of settlements before the mid-2000s when no-win, no-
fee law firms had first become involved in equal pay litigation. Since claims for six 
years’ back pay were not possible until around the same time, it is difficult to establish 
a straightforward causal link between the entry of no-win, no-fee law firms, and the 
growing incidence of back pay claims. Nevertheless, management representatives we 
spoke to said that back pay had not been part of early settlements following the replace-
ment of the white book by the SSA. When back pay did emerge as a negotiation issue, 
it was not related to the assessed value of a potential claim but was a ‘compensatory 
sum that [claimants] would accept in return for giving up their right to make a claim’, 
according to one of our interviewees. Amounts cited to us were between £8,000 and 
£10,000 in agreements struck between 2003 and 2005. Following the Allen ruling, 
they tended to be calculated as a percentage of an assessed claim and were in the vicin-
ity of £30–40,000 on average, with some claims as high as £100,000, according to 
media reports. For low-paid women these amounts were ‘life changing’, according to 
a union official we spoke to. This official cited a member close to retirement who told 
her she had ‘put central heating in [her] home for the first time ever’. He added that 
‘without the union, that money would never have been on the table’.
In contrast, the claimant’s lawyer we spoke to argued that unions had largely ignored 
their low-paid female members in negotiations, some of whom were ‘working full-time 
in the most difficult circumstances for £12,000 a year . . . [which] is virtually poverty 
wages’, and had put most of their energy into protecting male workers who were going 
to see their pay cut as a result of SSA. He cited the case of a local authority where a 
new pay structure was
implemented in 2003–2004 but women got not a single penny in back pay as a result . . . [while] 
the men got five years, 100% pay protection. . . . We don’t come onto the scene until late 2007 
[and] within three months of us coming on the scene they’re paying out £15 million in back pay 
to the women. . . . And the unions say ‘well we’ve been negotiating’.
In a different local authority where we interviewed, an HR manager told us that an 
agreement covering the former White Book manual workers had involved no back pay 
and six years’ pay protection for the mostly male employees. Workers in the male-dom-
inated manual grades had been put at the top of their new grades while the employees 
in the mostly female grades who had gained a pay rise were put at the bottom of the 
incremental scale. This council had agreed to look at enriching the jobs of those in 
receipt of pay protection to limit the impact on them of the ending of the period of pay 
protection as this ‘was a big issue for the unions at the time’.
Unions accepted that they had tried to minimise the impact on the ‘losers’ under 
single status but argued that this was an expected part of their role. ‘It’s traditional 
in most authorities that have a reorganisation, that a person gets lifetime protec-
tion; a person leaves, a new person comes in and gets that job’ at the lower rate, 
we were told. A  GMB official in the Allen tribunal had argued that ‘for a union 
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to agree a result, without fighting tooth and nail to prevent anybody from being 
a loser to a greater extent than is absolutely necessary, would be likely to drive all 
union members away’. Transitional arrangements had also been included in the SSA 
itself, though union guidance had highlighted that this could only be for a limited 
period and ‘not applied in a way which perpetuates gender discrimination’ (Unison, 
1997, p 7). Moreover, the combined advice given to officials by the GMB, TGWU 
and Unison had stated that single status would result in existing relativities being 
challenged and that officials should ‘be aware that not all members may welcome 
changes in existing hierarchies (the pecking order) and the effect on differentials that 
may result’ (GMB et al., 1998, p 14).
However, interviews with some union officials suggest that in certain cases at least, 
unions were negotiating to protect losers on a longer term basis through job enrich-
ment schemes. One official accepted that ‘this is going to look a bit obvious if we are 
only modernising and improving and enriching those services where they were pre-
dominantly male before’, and hence ‘we want every job looked at . . . [but] we would 
seek for them to prioritise those areas because that’s where our members are going 
to be most adversely affected’. The same official later acknowledged that enriching 
jobs ‘limited the ability of people to make claims’. In the Brennan litigation involving 
Sunderland City Council, a job evaluation scheme failed where it was found by the 
EAT to have been implemented in a ‘cynical’ manner so as to limit the impact on the 
predominantly male employees.
Unions nevertheless argued that they had to balance the interests of different groups 
of workers in striking an agreement as well as considering any potential future impact 
of an agreement, such as job losses, outsourcing or cuts in public services (on this 
point, see also Thornley, 2006; Colling, 2012; Guillaume, in press). Some employers 
we interviewed argued that their unions had acted ‘responsibly’ in negotiations by con-
sidering limited council budgets and trying to ‘future proof . . . services’. An HR man-
ager suggested that whilst the SSA had resulted in significant pay rises for low-paid 
women and back pay compensation that ‘might well be deserved’, this could increase 
pressures to outsource jobs: ‘they might gain in the short term [but] in the long term 
they could find themselves out of a job’ as a result of competition from private sector 
providers. However, the extent to which claims of a lack of employer resources were 
justified has been questioned in the light of evidence of central government’s reluc-
tance to finance in full the implementation of the equality agenda set out in the SSA 
(Conley, 2013).
6. Assessment and conclusion: equality law as an agent of social change
The advent of mass litigation over equal pay has proved enormously controversial in 
Britain over the course of the past decade, putting into ‘stark relief the potential con-
flict between individuals’ legal rights and collective attempts to agree viable, affordable 
guarantees of long-term pay equality for all employees in large, financially constrained 
public organizations’ (Dickens, 2007, p 483). As we have seen, critics of claimants’ law 
firms accused them of undermining collective bargaining and putting the financial sta-
bility of local government and even of some unions at risk. Predictions of union bank-
ruptcies have not been realised, however, and whilst the full impact of equal pay claims 
on local government finances has yet to be seen, it is unclear how far litigation can 
be linked to cuts in services or asset sales. Whether the intervention of claimants’ law 
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firms led to a shift in union strategy is hard to judge. Some union officials we spoke to 
maintained that they were moving to a more adversarial stance towards employers and 
making greater use of litigation before the entry of no-win, no-law firms after 2003. At 
the same time, comments of some union respondents, to the effect that litigation was 
sometimes initiated after 2003 in circumstances where it was harmful to the process of 
reaching an agreed settlement, suggests that the arrival of a new actor, prepared to take 
a more confrontational attitude towards both employers and the unions themselves, 
had led the unions to change their position, even if this was not in a way that union 
officials always felt happy with.
If there is evidence that litigation had, as our law firm interviewee suggested, acted as 
a catalyst in encouraging unions to pursue back pay and other claims on behalf of their 
female members, there is also evidence that the law firms’ strategies were dependent 
on the framework of collective pay determination that the unions were at the forefront 
of maintaining. Without formal pay structures of the kind associated with collective 
bargaining, claimants’ law firms would not have had the opportunity to bring claims 
of the kind they were pursuing. Without collective bargaining, it is doubtful that pay 
arrangements would have been sufficiently transparent for litigation to be launched.
The history of equal pay legislation in Britain illustrates the intertwining of collec-
tive bargaining and litigation strategies at every stage. As far back as the early 1970s, 
the Act’s objective of eliminating discriminatory pay structures was implemented 
through changes to sector-level collective agreements which were made in the ‘shadow 
of the law’, in anticipation of the Act coming into force in 1975. At a later point, 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the litigation in the North Yorkshire and Cleveland 
cases was a major catalyst for the SSA, and the implementation of the SSA, in turn, 
triggered the next wave of litigation in the 2000s. The dependence of litigation strate-
gies on the framework provided by collective bargaining is illustrated by the dearth of 
claims brought in the private sector during this period,7 which is also a result of the 
fragmentation of employment in the private sector, associated with outsourcing. Asked 
why claimants’ law firms focussed their activities on the public sector, the lawyer we 
interviewed responded as follows:
The private sector is much more difficult because the gender segregation is not within organisa-
tions generally, it’s between organisations. . . . So the restrictions on the equal pay legislation 
[are] such that if you have an employer who is only doing one job done by women, they have 
no prospects because they’ve got no comparator that they can make valid comparisons [with]. 
So the irony is the more privatisation there is the more difficult it is actually. . . . Privatisation is 
actually one of the best ways of preventing equal pay claims, either get rid of the comparator or 
get rid of the claim driver.
If litigation has essentially been complementary to collective bargaining in advancing 
an equality agenda, the recent British experience illustrates the role that legal actors 
can play in stimulating institutional and organisational change. In context, in the USA, 
with a weak state and decentralised court system, the HRM profession emerged as a 
significant actor in the implementation of civil rights legislation, developing ‘private 
7 There are signs that this may be changing, with mass claims launched against private sector firms for the 
first time in 2014. These include a claim supported by the law firm Leigh Day against the supermarket chain 
(and Walmart subsidiary) Asda (see Leigh Day, 2014). Although Asda is a private sector employer, the claim 
in this case, like those initiated by Stefan Cross Solicitors during the 2000s, arises from a context of collec-
tive bargaining, here involving Asda and the GMB trade union. At the time of writing (January 2015) the 
claim is still being litigated.
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codes of conduct’ within organisations for the ‘protection of citizen’s rights’ (Dobbin, 
2009, p 6). This has been a process not without a cost in terms of the de-radicalisation 
of human rights law (Edelman et  al., 2001). Yet the wave in equal pay claims that 
Britain experienced during the 2000s suggests that legal actors can play a proactive 
role in shaping the practical operation of human rights laws in ways that assist their 
intended beneficiaries. Whilst critics pointed to growing adversarialism in pay bargain-
ing, organisational uncertainty for some employers and deadweight costs from rising 
litigation, the entry of claimants’ law firms also demonstrated the potential for litiga-
tion strategies to deliver tangible gains for some of the most disadvantaged groups in 
society. Equality law may be a more potent agent of social change than has been gener-
ally acknowledged.
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